Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy from Triumph to Collapse: 1935-1943

Italy’s participation in WW2 has not been the subject of many books in English, and I have seen this one described in the press as the “definitive history” of the subject. It also covers Italy’s military adventures during the 1930s. The story is told very much from the strategic perspective. This isn’t a book where you will hear the voice of the ordinary soldier, nor does it really get down to even the tactical level. Quite large battles are often described in just a few paragraphs. Instead, this book looks at the high-level decision making that guided (if that’s the right word) Fascist Italy’s conduct of the wars it was involved in. There’s a huge emphasis on logistical issues – transport, materiel, the supply of raw materials etc. I suppose these are the sort of things the General Staff would have concerned themselves with. The book is informative, but personally I also found it quite dry, and over-heavy on statistics. There’s a mass of the latter, covering everything from numbers of trucks, tanks, aircraft, ships etc, to things like boots and bullets, and production figures for materials like steel and copper.<br /><br />The book starts with Fascist Italy’s initial military successes during the 1930s; the conquest of Abyssinia; its participation in the Spanish Civil War; and the occupation of Albania. These victories were achieved against opponents who were poorly equipped and poorly organised, or in the case of Albania, offered little resistance. Italy’s subsequent invasion of Greece was disastrous. In facing the British, and subsequently the Soviets and the Americans, the boot was on the other foot, with the Italians facing modern armies who in most respects were better equipped than they were.<br /><br />Mussolini is portrayed as someone who fantasised about recreating the “Mare Nostrum” of the Roman Empire. He wanted Italy to control the whole North African coast from Morocco to Egypt; also Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece; the south coast of France; and Malta and Gibraltar. On top of all that, Mussolini felt obliged to support Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, in recognition of Hitler having rescued him in Greece and North Africa. He seemed completely unable to concentrate on one objective at a time, constantly switching priorities and throwing military planning into confusion. The Italian economy, the weakest among the Great Powers, was of course quite unable to support his grandiose ambitions. The final section of the book provides a useful summary of how Italy’s campaign was doomed to disaster, the character of Mussolini himself being not the least of the reasons why.

John Gooch's Mussolini's War reviews the period of the Duce's overseas campaigns from Italy's war in Ethiopia (Abyssinia) in 1935 to its and Mussolini's denouement in 1943.<br /><br />Within this timeframe there is much more that the battles and operations Italy's armed forces undertook. They are present and for this reader, they were covered well at the level one expects in a history of this quality and aims; meaning that those looking for action at a fighting level with first-hand accounts this book will not be for you; the battles are brief and described at a command level with armies, corps and divisions but done well in the overall rationale and strategic plan.<br /><br />It is this command level along with the rational and strategic plan that Mr Gooch tells the story of Mussolini's War. The senior commanders of Italian forces feature heavily both in how they commanded their relevant arms and armies/ships/air forces and also how they worked (or not) together and interacted with Mussolini. The relationships with Hitler and the German senior staff and commanders are also described and help show how these developed, frayed and eventually broke down.<br /><br />For Mussolini, Ethiopia in 1935 was the start of Rome creating its new empire and following a good showing in the Spanish Civil War (which is well covered in the book), the commencement of WWII, saw Libya, East Africa/Ethiopia, The Balkans including the Adriatic coast, and Greece all coveted and then invaded (some successfully, others less so). Moreover, wanting to make sure Italy did not miss out on the spoils of war this time around Mussolini was keen to support Hitler and sent troops to Russia - the Italian experience of being late to war in WWI and not one of the major allies (France, Britain, USA) saw them miss out on, or so they thought, in areas of the Balkans for example.<br /><br />These forays into North and East Africa, the Balkans/Greece, the Mediterranean and Russia, whilst also defending home territory and in Vichy France once Germany took full control, stretched Italy's armed forces. All three military arms were in dire need of modernisation and to cope with the Duce's foreign operations huge expansion. <br /><br />Mr Gooch provides some fascinating information and data that clearly show Italy was clearly, even by 1940, never going to succeed. Simply, it did not have the men and material to create and operate the divisions, ships and squadrons needed and it also did not have the industrial base to manufacture armaments at pace. It also lacked the raw materials and natural resources (oil, steel, rubber) and the money, the people, food and infrastructure - notably roads and railways. It also struggled to design, develop and bring into production new tanks, artillery, ships and planes, let alone build the tens of thousands of trucks needed. Within this too, the industrial north of Italy suffered poor work relations with strikes and saw men drafted for military service and then returned. Italy was not on the total war footing that Britain, Canada, the USA and its ally Germany was. It is interesting to read that woman featured so little in Italy's home front industry. Whereas the aforementioned countries used women in almost all areas that men traditionally occupied in peacetime, in Italy this was not so. For example, in 1943 at Ansaldo Meccanico just 10% of the workforce were women. At Olivetti, the percentage of women workers stayed the same as that pre-war, and at Pirelli, the numbers of women workers actually dropped (pages 414/415).<br /><br />As such a number of Italian military and politicians knew of these supply problems and reported to Mussolini, yet little if anything was done to remedy. Estimates by the three services as early as 1940 saw requirements that could not be fulfilled thru the need for new tooling, designs and manufacture until 1942; other estimates to be properly equipped were given as 1944 and 45; astoundingly, estimates were made that should production be less than the required monthly run rates then the military would not be ready until <b>ten years later, 1955</b>.<br /><br /> This problem was exacerbated as Italy had no ally to provide investment or take up the gap to produce the numbers needed. It increasingly needed oil, steel and rubber (in astronomical tonnages) to meet its planned demands. This saw Italy continually call on Germany to provide the raw materials and resources and as war progressed actual tanks, planes, trucks and munitions.<br /><br />In short, Mt Gooch shows that whatever Italy did and where and how it fought it would never have the scale to create, deploy and maintain (with battlefield losses) the divisions it needed in Africa, The Balkans, Greece and in Russia, let alone at home especially as the air war came to Italy and its cities in advance of the landings at Sicily, Salerno and Anzio.<br /><br />There is some good information on the Italians in theatre. Again, this is not, as I mention above, detail fighting wise, but we do read of and get a very good understanding in how Italy became bogged down in Greece and especially the Balkans with partisan warfare as well as regular troops. The story in the Mediterranean for anti-shipping, convoy and actions such as against Malta are all covered and well described too.<br /><br />One area I was pleased to see was that of Italian troops and their performance on the battlefield. For many today, the Italian army is seen as a joke with poor performance, massive defeats, surrenders and abandonment of positions. It is true these happened, but it is also true that all armies in WWII had disasters. Yet Italian troops did fight hard, bravely and often to the last man. There are many examples in the Western Desert - Italian artillery units being one - and also in Russia. Where they came unstuck often through poor generalship (that includes German), poor supply, poor communications, outdated weapons and organisation not suited to modern war. Over 300k Italian dead soldiers, sailors and airmen testify to this.<br /><br />Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy. From Triumph to Collapse 1935-43, is a solid history that is readable, interesting and memorable. <br /><br />There are eleven black &amp; white maps (could be more and better); thirty-five black and white photos, and 26 mini-biographies of senior Italian commanders.<br /><br />My copy was a Penguin paperback with 532 pages. Published in 2021.

<i>A comprehensive account of Il Duce's disastrous attempt to make Italy a great power.</i><br /><br />In this book, John Gooch chronicles Mussoline and his forces in the events leading up to World War II and World War II itself. It shows Mussolini and his delusions on the role Italy could play and - without clear focus or strategic insight and chronical shortage in resources - becoming more and more dependent on Germany for fuel and weapons.<br /><br />The book starts with the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in October 1935, where two hundred thousand soldiers of the Italian Army attacked and defeated obsolete Ethiopian forces. It then deals with Italy's role in the Spanish civil war before it turns to the start of World War II.<br /><br />The successes in Abyssinia and (to a lesser extent) the Spanish civil war lead to Mussolini's overconfidence in the ability for the Italian army to wage a modern war. It also brings to the fore the Italian generals (Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio to name a few) and the personal rivalries between them.<br /><br />At the outbreak of World War II, it becomes quickly clear that the army is no match for the modern armies of France, Russia and the British. The Italian army is characterised in bureaucratic inertia which makes coordinated actions nearly impossible. Continual shortage in commodities like steel, coal and above all oil makes warfare more and more impossible. <br /><br />Due to Mussolini's erratic decisions, where his political ambitions do not match the army's capabilities, Italy is sucked into campaigns across north and east Africa, Russia and the Balkans, so the only way that Fascist Italy could earn her place was by depending ever more on Germany. Italy has the men, but lacks the material and resources. <br /><br />In the end, I started to wonder how Mussolini was able to hold on to power for such a long time, because after reading this book you wonder how such an incompetent man, without any grasp of strategy, was able to plunge Italy into such disaster.<br /><br />Do not expect a detailed description of the actual battles - large battles are often described in just a few paragraphs. Instead, the story focusses on the strategic level and logistical issues and resources. Detailed statistics are given on nearly everything: numbers of tanks, aircraft, ships even to things like boots and bullets, and production figures for materials like steel and copper. This I found very informative and any book detailing such an approach for any of the other major participants in World War II will earn a place on the top of the list of my to-read shelf.<br /><br />So all in all truly deserving a five star rating - a great description of Italy's grand strategy and a much needed introduction to Mussolini's disastrous leadership.

Chasing Mars.<br /><br />Italy’s entry into the Second World War in many ways resembles that of it’s old enemy Austria-Hungry in the Great War. A weakened power, latched onto a more powerful ally, a divided country with a military with an abysmal track record. Add this to a relativity destitute country and one gets what Geoffrey Wawro has described for Austria-Hungry as a ‘mad catastrophe’. For me, Benito Mussolini’s pursuit of glory was doomed from the start and if he wasn’t a Facist dictator, he wouldn’t have got Italy tangled up as he did in WWII, trying to make Italy a ‘great power’. This is the story of the the decline and fall of Facist Italy in the Second World War.<br /><br />Mussolini came to power in 1922, with his famous March on Rome. It is suggested that King Vittorio Emmanuelle III had an opportunity to prevent it, but stood by, from there on in the monarchy and the country was on a course for collapse. II Duce’s took over a country which was only formed in 1861, with the final ‘war of unification’ taking place in the Great War. Her international prestige was not great, switching from her allies Germany and Austria-Hungry and joining in 1915, she performed badly in WWI, especially in battles such as Caporetto. She was cast aside as a ‘second rate power’ at Versailles and like Imperial Japan became isolated from the allies. In the wake of this Mussolini wanted to forge a great and powerful Italy, one which dominated the Mediterranean and would seek its place among the elite in the world.<br /><br />The first task was Libya, conquered just before and then mostly lost in WWI, Italy saw these territories as its inherited right. This was a success and spurred the dictator with thirst for more. Next was the independent African nation of Abyssinia in 1935 and although threatened with sanctions from the weak League of Nations Italian forces entered and after initially being humiliated managed to subdue the empire, infamously with the use of poisoned gas. In 1936 Civil War came to Spain and all of the regimes of Europe looked to assert their influence for a favourable outcome. Even with huge debts, Italy provided ships, arms and then men to the conflict in an ever more desperate attempt to provide Francisco Franco with a victory. In 1939, the country was broke and military exposed as incompetent. Had much been achieved? Mussolini had certainly stomped in front of the other powers, but recognition and respect was not there. It was in May this year that the Pact of Steel was signed with Nazi Germany, that each would come to the others aid in a war. But with a megalomaniac in charge of the Third Reich and no money to wage any sort of effective war until 1943, this was a mad catastrophe.<br /><br />Within the Second World War, Italy got spread across five fronts. Mussolini knew she did not have the resources to fight on any, but persisted. No men, steel, tanks, aeroplanes, guns or oil to fight effectively anywhere. But he was now stuck with the Germans who thought very little of their Italian allies. For his bit Mussolini for very little of his Italian military and political leaders and would not listen to any advice offered. It is clear from John Gooch’s analysis that Italy was to be a servant to German war aims from the start. Where did it fit into the grand Mediterranean empire to invade the USSR? Germany said so and Italy followed. Greece was a disaster and Northern Africa only reaffirmed the inevitable, poor performance and road to defeat.<br /><br />There is focus on II Duce himself, a man who his generals thought was mad for the last four years of his regime. Incompetent with no grasp of military strategy, indecisive and only liking advice if it agreed with him. Tension was always at the top and there appeared to be no unwavering support like Hitler had in Germany. By 1943 the game was up, with multiple plots to topple him becoming apparent, complete lack of food or resources and demonstrations in the street, the country split in two. Arrested by the king and then rescued by the Nazis, Hitler did not allow Mussolini to quietly slip away but imposed him on a puppet republic in northern Italy. Soon after he and his mistress were caught and murdered. Amazing Gooch doesn’t touch on this subject at all. He does explain how the monarchy was put in a ‘lose-lose’ situation during the 20 years of Mussolini’s power and with the end of the war was also swept away, Winston Churchill tried to save it, FDR was not interested.<br /><br />The book was decent, but you need to have prior knowledge of WWII and Facist Italy to be able to understand it fully. I felt as if I need to read more around this subject to get the most of out this book. There is also a lack of an incredible amount of detail in certain points, I have mentioned the end of the regime is vastly swept over that if you blink you will miss it. Jumping around the various fronts made it also hard to follow. It is also not quite a political and not quite a military history of the war, battles aren’t described and internal political not much so either. So ultimately a very interesting subject is glossed over and as a result one comes away confused and asking questions. This is not the ultimate volume of Italy in WWII.

If, like me, you've read about most of the campaigns covered in this fine study over the years, why make the return visit? For one, Gooch is basically the English-speaking authority on the Italian military of the period, so one can safely assume that you're getting a solid analysis. Two, by examining the whole period in question from the strategic-operational perspective, one gets to trace Mussolini's relations with his flag-grade officers, how he used them, and vice-versa. Three, one can always learn something new. For example, Gooch treats how the moral corners that the Italian military learned to cut in its colonial wars, colored Italian behavior in its Balkan operations. Also, while Gooch has a lot to say about Italian admirals and generals (many of whom left diaries and post-war apologies), the airmen tend to waft through this book like ghosts; a commentary on the failure of Italian aviation to have an operational impact when involved in a fair fight.<br /><br />Be that as it it may, in the final analysis, this work reinforces the reality that Italy had no business being involved in World War II until it absolutely had to, let alone jumping in as early as possible to try gain what what it supposedly deserved. But, at the end of the day, Mussolini made all his decisions through the prism of politics; not economic reality or military necessity.<br /><br />One further thought is to note that I read this book, in part, because I thought it would make the author's own "Mussolini and His Generals" (2007) redundant. But, with Gooch's "The Italian Army and the First World War," one really has something of a trilogy.

<i>Armchair generals talk tactics; real generals talk logistics.<br /> - Army proverb</i><br /><br />This book spends as much time discussing the logistics of the Italian war effort as it does the political and military maneuvering, because logistics is the key to understanding how Mussolini’s grand – and grandiose – plans came crashing down. Too many books gloss over the importance of creating and distributing essential war material, making it seem almost as if ships and planes and guns are simply created out of thin air. The Italians were chronically short of everything, starting with raw materials and fuel, but including trained officers and NCOs, guns, ammunition, ships, aircraft, artillery, trucks, and shipping. One of the divisions sent to Russia had no transport, and had to walk 1400 kilometers to get to the front lines. Despite all these crippling shortages, Italy’s soldiers fought well across half a dozen different theaters of operations, tying down enemy armies and fleets that the Allies would have preferred to use elsewhere.<br /><br />The book begins with Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. General Pietro Badoglio conquered a territory as large as France and Germany combined in only six months, which the western powers assumed would take at least two years if it could be done at all. Badoglio formulated and executed a campaign using multiple columns of infantry supported by aircraft to penetrate deep into Ethiopian territory, supplemented by poison gas in large quantities. The campaign helped salvage Badoglio’s career, which was still shadowed by allegations that he had been partly responsible for the disaster at Caporetto during World War I, when he abandoned his headquarters and his troops to save himself.<br /><br />Italy provided large scale and effective support to Franco during the Spanish Civil War, possibly tipping the balance of the conflict, and gained valuable experience for its army in combined ground/air operations. “By mid-February 1937 there were 48,230 Italian troops in Spain, together with 46 light tanks, 488 guns, 706 assault mortars and 1,211 machine guns.” The fighting there also bound Italy more tightly into Hitler’s orbit, and broke ties with the Soviet Union.<br /><blockquote><br />In the 1920s and early 1930s relations between [Italy and the Soviet Union] had been relatively amicable. It seemed then that they had more in common than not, especially their hostility towards capitalist-imperialist powers. ‘Corporativist’ Fascists claimed that Fascism and bolshevism stood side by side against the bourgeois plutocracies, and Fascist ideologues argued that both movements agreed on the necessity of a centralized and unitary state underpinned by strict discipline, differing only over the means to achieve it.<br /><br />Moscow’s support for League of Nations sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian war, and her support for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War, changed all that. Thereafter, as far as Fascist Italy was concerned, the two ‘popular’ revolutionary polities were fundamentally in conflict.<br /></blockquote><br />Mussolini knew a European war was coming, and that having thrown his lot in with Hitler, he would have to join the German war effort at some point. Had they not done so, Italy would continue to be seen as a second rate power, and Il Duce had visions of himself ruling over a mighty empire spanning southern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Nevertheless, he knew that Italy did not have the industrial base to sustain a long war, and asked Hitler to defer hostilities until 1943. Mussolini’s war planners wanted an even longer delay, “The message...was crystal clear: Italy was not yet ready to fight and would not be fully ready even to begin to do so until 1945. Only in 1949 would she be fully ready to fight for a year and if labour only worked one ten-hour shift a day that date would be set back by a decade.”<br /><br />Hitler, as usual, took no account of his ally’s wishes when preparing his war plans, but even he was surprised that France and Britain would go to war over an authoritarian state like Poland, when they had taken no action after the Sudetenland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Danzig.<br /><br />As it had in World War I, Italy sat out the start of World War II. It was only after Germany’s stunning six week victory over France that they joined in, hoping to claim a share of the spoils. Mussolini wanted southeastern France as far as the Rhone river, including the city of Nice, but the creation of the Vichy government turned France into an ostensible ally of Germany, frustrating his plans.<br /><br />And plans he had. His visions of glory were vastly greater than the ability of his armies to realize them. At various times he considered attacking Gibraltar, Malta, Tunisia, Corsica, Albania, Greece, France again, and Egypt, while expanding the colonial holdings in Ethiopia. He changed his mind so often that the armed forces commanders eventually stopped ordering detailed plans, certain that his attention would soon wander off to some new scheme.<br /><br />Mussolini today is remembered as a buffoon, and this book will not change that impression, so it is surprising to hear that in the 1920s and 30s he was one of the world’s most respected leaders. Gandhi hailed him as “one of the great statesmen of our time,” and Churchill said, “If I had been Italian, I am sure I would have been with you from the beginning.” Even George Bernard Shaw said of him that “Socialists should be delighted to find at last a Socialist who speaks and thinks as responsible rulers do.”<br /><br />Mussolini’s ambitions knew no bounds. After some early success in North Africa, before the British had organized their defenses in Egypt, “the army began planning the carve-up of Africa. Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal would share out African territory, leaving France with a minimal stake and allowing Egypt and the Union of South Africa to remain in existence, free of British influence, as the only two independent states.” Closer to home “Even Switzerland became a potential theatre of operations: by mid-July the army had a plan for the joint dismemberment of the country with Germany.”<br /><br />Nothing ever turned out the way the great leader planned. The invasion of Albania was met by a furious Greek response, which sent the Italian divisions tumbling back toward the coast where they were in danger of being annihilated before Germany sent troops sweeping in to conquer the Balkans and Greece it self. Afterwards the Italians were faced with a growing and increasingly violent insurgency, which they tried to handle diplomatically, while the German response to resistance was to massacre everyone in the vicinity.<br /><br />The fighting in North Africa had the goal of invading Egypt and seizing or rendering unusable the Suez Canal. Hitler was willing to support this, and offered Italy bombers and an armored division, but Mussolini, still believing that he should be treated as a full equal with Germany, turned them down. It is interesting to speculate on the course of the war if a joint Italo-German offensive had swept into Egypt before the British defenders were ready. However, even when the Germans came in force with Rommel, it soon became clear that defeat was just a matter of time. Allied Naval forces in the Mediterranean had increased to the point where attempting to resupply Africa was a suicide mission and eventually the Axis forces there, starved of fuel and supplies, surrendered en masse.<br /><br />The Italians joined the German invasion of Russia and took part in the initial successes. Unlike the Germans, the Italians knew their forces would have to fight during the brutal Russian winter, and provided appropriate clothing for their soldiers. The Italian effort would end catastrophically at Stalingrad. “Facing the two Italian corps (II and XXXV) and the twelve battalions of the Cosseria and Ravenna divisions, each on average 300 to 400 men strong, that were their immediate targets were ninety Red Army rifle battalions backed by twenty-five battalions of motorized infantry and 754 tanks supported by 810 guns and 1,255 mortars, 300 anti-tank guns and 200 rocket launchers.”<br /><br />Just prior to the start of Stalingrad the Italian 8th Army had numbered 229,888 men. By the end of January 1943 they had taken 114,520 casualties, including 84,830 dead. Over 70,000 were taken prisoner: 22,000 died on the way to captivity and 38,000 in the POW camps, In 1946, when the survivors were released, only 10,032 returned home.<br /><br />Once the American and British forces had taken North Africa, everyone knew it was only a matter of time before they selected their next target, but the Italians were left guessing as to whether it would be Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, southern France, or Greece. When the Allies landed in Sicily it was clear that Italy was almost finished, and that a landing on the Italian peninsula was soon to come. “The Sicilian campaign cost the Italians some 40,800 dead and missing and 116,681 prisoners of war. German losses added up to 8,900 dead and missing and 5,523 prisoners of war. The Allied armies suffered much less: 4,299 dead and 13,083 wounded.”<br /><br />By this time the entire Italian war effort was unraveling, and people just wanted peace. Mussolini was dismissed by the king, arrested, freed by the Germans, and set up as the head of a rump government in northern Italy. Confused plans were made for the armies, for the Italians to stop fighting and move to defensive positions in the south, and meanwhile the Germans disarmed their erstwhile allies and retreated behind strong defensive positions in the north of the country.<br /><br />Mussolini was a gambler, and he staked everything on rapid German victory. When it became clear that the war would be protracted, and the United States entered the conflict, and once the Soviet Union stabilized its lines and went on the offensive, there was only one way the war would end. It nevertheless ground on for three more bloody years, with millions of deaths and great cities of Europe reduced to rubble. A smarter man, an abler politician, would have recognized the long odds and reduced Italy’s exposure to catastrophe, but Mussolini was blinded by visions of glory and led his country into the abyss.<br />

This is a non-fic about (military) history of Fascist Italy in the 30s and 40s. it is very heavy on data (who ordered how many troops to go where) and therefore a nice reference, but maybe not the best overview book, especially on audio, at least for me.<br /><br />It is very interesting because unlike many historical novels it shows what info was available whenthis or that decision was made, not what we know really happened after. Maybe one of the prominent example is joining the WW2. The WW2 started on September, 1st, but Italy hasn’t joined Germany until mid-1940, after Germany almost finished France: “The Dunkirk evacuation began on 26 May. Three days later Mussolini called the heads of the armed forces together and told them he was going to join in the war at any time from 5 June. Waiting for a fortnight or a month would not improve things and would risk giving Germany the impression that the Italians were arriving ‘when the job was done’. Joining in when the risk was minimal would do Italy no good when it came to peacemaking.” He was warned that the army isn’t ready and won’t be ready for at least several years (it just started reform and re-armament, scheduled to end in 1949!), but the situation was that after France the operation of attack on England was expected and Mussolini feared to jump in too late.<br /><br />Another important issue that book shows perfectly is that modern wars are won not on battlefields but by ones with better logistics and deeper pockets. Mussolini often wanted to go fast and decisive but it is impossible to throw armies from theater to theater instantly, especially if your armies are only on paper. For example, to join the war against the USSR, Mussolini sends “an army corps composed of two ‘auto-transportable’ infantry divisions (a term which meant that they were trained as lorry-borne troops, but not that they actually possessed the lorries they needed)” and starts to seek lorries after the commitment, so that “Watching the drive-past of requisitioned trucks still carrying the names of the commercial companies they had come from, one of Mussolini’s diplomatic entourage saw ‘a gypsy-like improvisation’ when compared with the highly organized German war machine.”<br /><br />Also the lightning war or Blitzkrieg was suggested and used by Italians under the name guerra lampo (‘fast war’) as early as Abyssinian campaign of 1935. To which they prepared for three years and it was a victory of logisticians and engineers, who created roads and readied supplies.<br /><br />With deficit of almost everything from trained officers to rubber, steel and coal, it is more surprising that they were able to keep even for so long. <br />

This is a comprehensive and detailed military history of engagements fought by the Italian armed forces from then early 1920’s until the end of WWII. As a British reader, my knowledge of WWII has been generally though the Allies’ perspective so it was interesting to view this though the minor partner in the Axis forces. Gooch is an expert on Italian military history and there is plenty here for the avid military historian from the detailed internecine squabbles of Italian generals to the minutiae of quartermaster supplies in the North African theatre. For myself there was sadly too much of an emphasis on WWII and very little (comparatively) on the Ethiopian war and Italian East Africa. Donald Trump shares much of the capriciousness of Mussolini as I write from a 2020 perspective. Bombastic, a self proclaimed expert on every topic and vain. I doubt, however, that they will share the same endgame but will no doubt share a similar space in history.

"There is too much history, and only me and old Muss to handle it".--- Ezra Pound. This book might be better titled "How to Lose a War" by Benito Mussolini. First, always fight with Italians under your command. Second, take the Germans for allies. You know they always treat their allies as partners. Third, fight on as many fronts as possible simultaneously; in this case North Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. This book will come in handy for those who recognize that per Napoleon, "an army travels on its stomach" and Il Duce could neither feed his troops nor could Italians, soldiers, and civilians, stomach the wars of 1936-1945. Over the years I've had fruitful conversations with Italians on why their military has historically been so feeble. "We're lovers, not fighters", one fratello told me. D'acordo, amico.

An extremely well written account of the Italian armed forces' performance in ww2, which as explained by the author was abysmal due to Mussolini and his governments' incompetence. <br /><br />This book does a good job of explaining the war from Italy's point of view on a tactical and strategic level, while excelling at neither but does acommendable job at both considering the small page count of 423.<br /><br />For a five star rating I would have wanted further exploration of specific reasons why italy's economy was so poor and their military so under equipped compared to their European counterparts, as well a brief run-through of Italian military performance after the armistice with the allies.<br /><br />Otherwise, this is a great introduction to Italian military campaigns before and during ww2, highly recommend.